PraisonAI has Cross-Workspace IDOR and Privilege Escalation via Platform API

### Summary The PraisonAI Platform API has two authorization failures that together break workspace isolation. The service layer for issues and projects performs global primary-key lookups without checking workspace ownership, so any authenticated user can read, modify, and delete resources in any workspace just by swapping UUIDs in their API requests. On top of that, every member management endpoint (add, update role, remove) only requires `min_role="member"`, which lets any workspace member promote themselves to owner and kick out the original owner. A low-privilege member of one workspace can steal data from every other workspace and take over any workspace they belong to. Both issues come from the same gap: the route layer pulls `workspace_id` from the URL and verifies membership, but the service layer ignores the workspace scope for resource lookups and ignores the caller's role level for member operations. The `require_workspace_member()` dependency does its job correctly. The problem is that the service layer doesn't use the information it provides. ### Details #### Part 1: Cross-Workspace IDOR (Issues and Projects) **Vulnerable Files:** - `praisonai_platform/services/issue_service.py` - `praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py` - `praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py` - `praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py` There is a consistent split between the route layer and the service layer. Routes pull `workspace_id` from the URL and verify membership: ``` GET /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id} ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ require_workspace_member() checks this ``` But the service methods these routes call perform global lookups that ignore `workspace_id` entirely: **IssueService.get(), line 72:** ```python async def get(self, issue_id: str) -> Optional[Issue]: """Get issue by ID.""" return await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id) ``` **ProjectService.get(), line 47:** ```python async def get(self, project_id: str) -> Optional[Project]: """Get project by ID.""" return await self._session.get(Project, project_id) ``` Both use `session.get(Model, pk)`, which is a global lookup by primary key with no `WHERE workspace_id = ?` filter. Compare that with the properly scoped `list_for_workspace()` methods in the same files: **IssueService.list_for_workspace(), line 76:** ```python async def list_for_workspace(self, workspace_id: str, ...) -> list[Issue]: stmt = select(Issue).where(Issue.workspace_id == workspace_id) # ... properly scoped ``` The listing is scoped correctly. The get, update, and delete methods are not. Since `update()` and `delete()` in both services call `self.get()` internally, the workspace bypass cascades through all write operations too. **Route that discards workspace_id, issues.py line 82:** ```python @router.get("/{issue_id}", response_model=IssueResponse) async def get_issue( workspace_id: str, # Extracted from URL issue_id: str, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # Membership verified session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): svc = IssueService(session) issue = await svc.get(issue_id) # workspace_id never passed to service ``` **All affected operations:** | Service | Method | Line | Workspace scoped? | |---------|--------|------|-------------------| | IssueService | `get()` | 72 | No, uses `session.get(Issue, issue_id)` | | IssueService | `update()` | 97 | No, calls `self.get(issue_id)` | | IssueService | `delete()` | 150 | No, calls `self.get(issue_id)` | | IssueService | `list_for_workspace()` | 76 | **Yes**, filters by `workspace_id` | | ProjectService | `get()` | 47 | No, uses `session.get(Project, project_id)` | | ProjectService | `update()` | 62 | No, calls `self.get(project_id)` | | ProjectService | `delete()` | 88 | No, calls `self.get(project_id)` | | ProjectService | `get_stats()` | 97 | No, only filters by `project_id` | | ProjectService | `list_for_workspace()` | 51 | **Yes**, filters by `workspace_id` | #### Part 2: Workspace Takeover via Missing Role Enforcement **Vulnerable Files:** - `praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py` (member management routes) - `praisonai_platform/api/deps.py` (authorization dependency) - `praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py` (role hierarchy implementation) The authorization dependency supports role-based access: **require_workspace_member(), deps.py line 54:** ```python async def require_workspace_member( workspace_id: str, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user), session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), min_role: str = "member", # Accepts higher roles, but nobody passes them ) -> AuthIdentity: member_svc = MemberService(session) has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role) if not has: raise HTTPException(status_code=403, ...) ``` The `has_role()` method correctly implements role hierarchy: **MemberService.has_role(), member_service.py line 80:** ```python async def has_role(self, workspace_id, user_id, required_role) -> bool: """Role hierarchy: owner > admin > member.""" member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id) if member is None: return False role_levels = {"owner": 3, "admin": 2, "member": 1} user_level = role_levels.get(member.role, 0) required_level = role_levels.get(required_role, 0) return user_level >= required_level ``` This works correctly, but no route ever calls `require_workspace_member` with `min_role="owner"` or `min_role="admin"`. Every member management route uses the default `"member"`: **Self-promotion, workspaces.py line 115:** ```python @router.patch("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", response_model=MemberResponse) async def update_member_role( workspace_id: str, user_id: str, body: MemberUpdate, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # min_role="member" session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), ): member_svc = MemberService(session) member = await member_svc.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role) # No check: is user modifying their own role? (self-promotion) # No check: is body.role > caller's current role? (escalation) # No check: is target a higher role than caller? (modifying superiors) ``` **Owner removal, workspaces.py line 130:** ```python @router.delete("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", status_code=204) async def remove_member( workspace_id: str, user_id: str, user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # min_role="member" ... ): member_svc = MemberService(session) removed = await member_svc.remove(workspace_id, user_id) # No check: is target a higher role than caller? # No check: is this the last owner? ``` Three checks are missing from `update_member_role`: self-modification, upward escalation, and modifying superiors. Two checks are missing from `remove_member`: role hierarchy and last-owner protection. ### PoC **Prerequisites:** - A running PraisonAI Platform instance with default configuration - No special configuration required **Server setup:** ```bash cd /path/to/PraisonAI pip install -e "src/praisonai-platform" python -m uvicorn praisonai_platform.api.app:create_app \ --factory --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000 ``` #### Scenario: Full attack chain (IDOR + Privilege Escalation) **Step 1: Victim (CEO) creates workspace with sensitive data** ```bash BASE="http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1" # Register CEO VICTIM=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/auth/register" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"email":"ceo@targetcorp.com","password":"Secure123!","name":"CEO"}') VICTIM_TOKEN=$(echo "$VICTIM" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])") VICTIM_ID=$(echo "$VICTIM" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['user']['id'])") # CEO creates workspace with confidential