NodeVM builtin denylist bypass via process and inspector/promises allows host code execution

## Summary `NodeVM` blocks several dangerous Node.js builtins such as `module`, `worker_threads`, `cluster`, `vm`, `repl`, and `inspector`. However, the denylist misses `process` and `inspector/promises`. Both can be used from sandboxed code to reach host-side execution primitives. This allows sandboxed code to bypass the intended builtin restrictions and execute code in the host process. ## Details The dangerous builtin denylist is defined in `lib/builtin.js`. This list does not include: ```text process inspector/promises ``` Non-denied builtins are exposed to the sandbox through: ```js builtins.set(key, special ? special : vm => vm.readonly(hostRequire(key))); ``` Because of this, sandboxed code can bypass the expected restrictions in two ways: 1. `require('process').getBuiltinModule('child_process')` reloads `child_process`, even when `child_process` is excluded. 2. `require('inspector/promises')` exposes the Inspector protocol and can call `Runtime.evaluate` in the host process. ## PoC Tested on: ```text vm2: 3.11.2 Node.js: v25.9.0 ``` Run from the vm2 repository root: ```bash node poc/dangerous-builtin-denylist-rce.js ``` [dangerous-builtin-denylist-rce.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27570113/dangerous-builtin-denylist-rce.js) The PoC first confirms the intended restrictions work: ```text require("inspector"): BLOCKED require("child_process"): BLOCKED ``` Then it bypasses them: ```text require("process").getBuiltinModule("child_process").execFileSync(...) ``` This spawns a host child process. It also confirms: ```text require("inspector/promises").Session().post("Runtime.evaluate", ...) ``` This evaluates JavaScript in the host process. <img width="858" height="766" alt="Screenshot 2026-05-10 at 11 53 33 AM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7614aecb-5ffd-4c41-bfe8-e1fcb3b1bb59" /> ## Impact An attacker who can run untrusted JavaScript inside `NodeVM` with affected builtin settings can escape the sandbox and execute arbitrary code in the host process. This can lead to full compromise of the application process, including reading files, writing files, spawning processes, and accessing host environment secrets. (This is not reachable with the default NodeVM configuration where require is disabled or no affected builtins are allowed. It affects applications that allow process, inspector/promises, or the wildcard "*" in require.builtin.) ## Suggested fix Add `process` and `inspector/promises` to the dangerous builtin blocklist. Also consider blocking dangerous builtin families by prefix, for example blocking both: ```text inspector inspector/* ``` instead of only exact module names. Source Code Location: https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2 Affected Packages: - npm:vm2, affected <= 3.11.3, patched in 3.11.4 CWEs: - CWE-693: Protection Mechanism Failure CVSS: - Primary: score 10.0, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - CVSS_V3: score 10.0, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H References: - https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/security/advisories/GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4 - https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/commit/a1ed47a98d1cc36cb48c0d566d55889688e0b59b - https://github.com/patriksimek/vm2/releases/tag/v3.11.4 - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rp36-8xq3-r6c4