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axios Vulnerable to Credential Theft and Response Hijacking via Prototype Pollution Gadget in Config Merge

CVE-2026-44495RCE2026-05-29

漏洞描述

## Summary Axios versions before the fixed releases contain prototype-pollution gadgets in request config processing. If another vulnerability in the same JavaScript process has already polluted `Object.prototype.transformResponse`, affected Axios versions may treat that inherited value as request configuration or as an option validator. Axios does not itself create the prototype pollution. Exploitability requires a separate prototype-pollution vulnerability or equivalent attacker control over `Object.prototype` before Axios creates a request. ## Impact For ordinary prototype-pollution primitives that can only assign JSON-like values, this issue primarily results in request failures or denial-of-service attacks. If the attacker can pollute `Object.prototype.transformResponse` with a function, affected versions of Axios may execute it. In fully affected versions, the function can observe response data and request config, including URL, headers, and `auth`, and can change the response data returned to application code. This function-valued condition is important. Most query-string or JSON parser prototype-pollution bugs cannot create JavaScript functions on their own, so credential exposure and response tampering are conditional rather than automatic consequences of such bugs. ## Affected Functionality The affected functionality is Axios request config processing and response transformation. Affected use requires all of the following: - An affected Axios version. - A polluted `Object.prototype` in the same process or browser context. - Pollution before Axios merges or validates the request config. - A polluted key relevant to Axios config, especially `transformResponse`. This is not specific to the Node HTTP adapter. Browser and Node usage can both pass through the shared config/transform pipeline, though real-world exploitability depends on the surrounding application and any helper vulnerabilities. ## Technical Details In affected versions, `mergeConfig()` reads config values through normal property access. For config keys present in Axios defaults, including `transformResponse`, a missing own property on the request config can fall through to `Object.prototype`. In the fully affected path, this means `Object.prototype.transformResponse` can replace Axios's default response transform. The selected transform is later executed by `transformData()` with the request config as `this`. Some later affected v1 releases guarded the merge path but still used inherited properties while looking up validators in `validator.assertOptions()`. In that narrower case, a polluted function can still run during config validation and inspect the config argument, but it does not replace the response transform. Fixed versions use own-property checks and null-prototype config objects, so inherited `Object.prototype` values are not treated as Axios config or validator schema entries. ## Proof of Concept of Attack ```js import http from 'http'; import axios from 'axios'; const seen = []; const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json'); res.end(JSON.stringify({ secret: 'response-secret' })); }); await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve)); Object.prototype.transformResponse = function pollutedTransform(data, headers, status) { if (headers && typeof status === 'number') { seen.push({ url: this.url, username: this.auth && this.auth.username, password: this.auth && this.auth.password, responseData: data }); return { hijacked: true }; } return true; }; try { const { port } = server.address(); const response = await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/users`, { auth: { username: 'svc-account', password: 'prod-secret-key-123' } }); console.log(response.data); // { hijacked: true } console.log(seen[0]); // request config plus original response body } finally { delete Object.prototype.transformResponse; server.close(); } ``` Expected result on fully affected versions: the polluted transform runs, captures request config and response data, and replaces the response returned to the caller. Expected result on fixed versions: the polluted transform is ignored, and the original response is returned. <details> <summary>Original source report</summary> ## Summary The Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution "Gadget" attack that allows any `Object.prototype` pollution in the application's dependency tree to be escalated into **credential theft** and **response hijacking** across all Axios requests. The `mergeConfig()` function reads config properties via standard property access (`config2[prop]`), which traverses the JavaScript prototype chain. When `Object.prototype.transformResponse` is polluted with a function, it **overrides the default JSON response parser** for every request. The injected function executes with `this = config`, exposing `auth.username`, `auth.password`, request URL, and all headers. **Severity:** High (CVSS 8.2) **Affected Versions:** All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0) **Vulnerable Component:** `lib/core/mergeConfig.js` (Config Merge) + `lib/core/transformData.js` (Transform Execution) ## CWE - **CWE-1321:** Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution') ## CVSS 3.1 **Score: 9.4 (High)** Vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:H` | Metric | Value | Justification | |---|---|---| | Attack Vector | Network | PP is triggered remotely via any vulnerable dependency | | Attack Complexity | Low | Once PP exists, a single property assignment exploits axios. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx scoring | | Privileges Required | None | No authentication needed | | User Interaction | None | No user interaction required | | Scope | Unchanged | Credential theft occurs within the same application process | | Confidentiality | High | `this.auth.password`, `this.url`, original response data all exfiltrated | | Integrity | Low | Response data is replaced with `true` — attacker **cannot** return arbitrary data due to `assertOptions` constraint (see below) | | Availability | High | Polluting with an array value causes `TypeError: validator is not a function` crash (DoS) on every request | ### Relationship to GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx This vulnerability is in the same class as GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx ("Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain"), which was also a PP gadget in axios rated Critical. Both require zero direct user input and exploit `mergeConfig`'s prototype chain traversal. | Factor | GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx | This Vulnerability | |---|---|---| | Attack vector | PP → Header injection → Request smuggling | PP → Transform function override → Credential theft | | Fixed by 1.15.0 header sanitization? | Yes | **No — different code path** | | Affects | Requests using form-data package | **All requests** (transformResponse is in defaults) | | Impact | AWS IMDSv2 bypass, cloud compromise | Credential theft (auth, API keys), response hijacking, DoS | ## Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities This vulnerability requires **Zero Direct User Input**. If an attacker can pollute `Object.prototype` via any other library in the stack (e.g., `qs`, `minimist`, `lodash`, `body-parser`), Axios will automatically pick up the polluted `transformResponse` property during its config merge. The critical difference from GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: this vector was **NOT fixed** by the header sanitization patch in v1.15.0, because it does not use headers at all — it injects a function into the response processing pipeline. ## Proof of Concept ### 1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution) Imagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets: ```javascript Object.prototype.transformResponse = function(data, headers, status) { // Steal credentials via this context (this = full request config

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